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INTRODUCTION 
Tracking objects as language unfolds 
Imagine you are watching a cooking show. You can see the chef make lasagna 
and you can also hear her describe what she is doing. As you are hearing “now we are 
going to chop the onion”, you can actually see the chef locating the onion on her cutting 
board, taking the knife from the knife stand and chopping the onion. You can see the 
onion change from a round, ball-shaped object into a bunch of small white pieces. And 
despite the dissimilarity between the initial and the end state of the onion (before and 
after cutting), you still know that both the round object and the small white pieces can be 
referred to as onion and, moreover, they are the same instance of an onion (we will refer 
to such instances which are contextualized in space and time as tokens). In real life, after 
the onion has been chopped, there is no way back – it can’t become intact. In language, 
if you were to describe what the chef will do in the video to someone else, you would have 
more flexibility in which state of the onion to direct your listener’s attention to. You could 
say The chef will chop the onion. And then, she will smell the onion. in which case, upon 
hearing the onion in the second sentence your listener would most probably think of a 
chopped onion. However, you could also say The chef will chop the onion. But first, she 
will smell the onion. – in this case, the second sentence refers to the intact onion. The 
temporal connectives (And then vs But first) which differ between these two sentences 
point to which state of the onion (intact or chopped) to incorporate into the mental 
representation of the event described by the unfolding language which means that both 
should be available in the course of discourse comprehension. How these 
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representations interact during sentence-level language comprehension is, broadly, the 
question of the present study.  
Some theories of language comprehension suggest that it relies on continuous 
mapping of lexical items onto the meaning representations stored in our semantic 
memory which eventually leads to the construction of situation models (Zwaan & 
Radvansky, 1998) – mental representations of situations described by language. When 
heard in isolation, individual words can elicit representations of generic objects stored in 
our long-term semantic memory and associated with a given word. For example, the word 
“onion” in isolation could elicit an aggregate mental image of a generic onion which lacks 
any spatio-temporal details. However, we usually communicate with longer utterances 
which create a context for the words they consist of, which leads to retrieval of more 
specific representations. The representations we build in our mind during language 
comprehension can be even more specific, for example in cases when language 
describes events that unfold in real time in front of our eyes. As in the first example, if we 
are watching a video of someone cooking we know very fine-grained details about the 
objects which are being referred to by language. If we hear the chef describing how she 
is going to cook the onion, we know the onion’s size (could be a small or an unusually 
large onion), color (could be red or yellow), location (changes as the language unfolds: 
first on the table, then on the cutting board, then on the frying pan), shape (perhaps not 
ideally round), etc. And even though the objects described by the language are out there 
in the real world, we are still building their mental representations which are dissociable 
from the perceptually available counterparts. A study by Altmann and Kamide (2009) used 
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eye-tracking and a visual world paradigm to explore the mapping between the language 
describing what happens to displayed objects and internal representations of those 
objects. Participants in the study saw static images depicting semi-realistic scenes and 
heard sentences describing people in the scene act upon objects in the scene either 
concurrently with scene presentation or following it. Critically, scenarios describing 
location change (e.g. The woman will move the glass to the table) were compared to 
scenarios which didn’t describe such change (e.g. The woman is too lazy to move the 
glass to the table). Altmann and Kamide found that after having heard the sentences 
describing location change, the participants were more likely to look at the new location 
when the target object (the glass) was referenced again later in the discourse (She then 
poured some wine into the glass) compared to the control sentences which didn’t describe 
location change. Thus, this study demonstrated that people update their internal 
representations of objects as dictated by language and such representations are 
separable from the perceptually salient visual representations of objects. 
In the Altmann & Kamide (2009) study, the glass changed state insofar as it 
changed from one location to another. In the onion example above, the onion changes 
intrinsic state, and these distinct states are associated with the same object. For example, 
the sentence The chef will chop the onion introduces the onion and the details about it: 
it’s the onion in the kitchen (and not in the garden or on the shelf in a store) and it is about 
to undergo change (it will be chopped). The event of chopping entails changes in the state 
of the onion and a single representation of an onion is not enough to understand that the 
event took place, i.e. chopping inherently implies the transition of an onion from an intact 
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to a chopped state. All these details about the onion, including featurally contrasting 
representations of its initial and end states, now become a part of this particular onion’s 
history. The unfolding language may selectively refer to either state of the onion, i.e. And 
then/but first, she will smell the onion. How much of this onion’s history is retrieved at its 
second mention? One possibility is that both representations of the onion are active at 
this point, with each competing for selection – a competition which needs to be resolved 
whenever the same object is referred to again. In this case, no matter what the temporal 
term is in the subsequent sentence (And then or But first), the processing cost would be 
higher than in scenarios which didn’t introduce the object in different states. Another 
possibility is that we keep in our episodic memory only the most recent representation, 
i.e. the chopped onion, in which case we would predict the increase of processing cost 
only in the sentences which make one travel in time and retrieve the initial state as in But 
first, she will smell the onion. Finally, the reference to the onion could in principle elicit the 
prototypical representation of the onion (presumably, in its intact round shape), in which 
case in sentences which refer to the resultant changed state (And then sentences), the 
prototypical representation needs to be adjusted, which could also lead to increased 
processing cost. To summarize, the first possibility predicts interference and competition 
(and as a consequence, increase in processing cost associated with resolving it) between 
state representations regardless of the intended state. The second possibility predicts 
interference between the most recent state and the initial state only for the But first 
scenarios, while the third possibility predicts interference between the prototypical object 
and its changed state only for the And then scenarios.  
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One way to explore these possibilities it to look into the brain and see whether 
brain areas associated with competition during selection of alternative incompatible 
interpretations would also be recruited for processing the object which underwent change, 
and if so, in which scenarios (And then, But first or both?). One such brain area of interest 
is left posterior ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (left pVLPFC) (for a discussion, see 
Thompson-Schill, Bedny, & Goldberg 2005). Hindy, Altmann, Kalenik, & Thompson-Schill 
(2012) ran an fMRI study to look at whether left pVLPFC would be sensitive to the state 
change manipulation, and if so, under which conditions. They found that indeed left 
pVLPFC was more active as participants read sentences describing significant change 
as compared to scenarios which entailed minimal or no change. Moreover, activation in 
left pVLPFC correlated with the degree of change (rated in a separate on-line norming 
study) suggesting that the more dissimilar the representations are, the more they 
interfere. This interference took place regardless of whether the subsequent sentence 
referred to the resultant (And then, …) or the initial (But first, …) states of the object, 
suggesting that both are available and competing for selection given their mutual 
exclusivity. 
To further explore this object states competition effect and whether state 
representations interfere only when they are bound to the same object token (and, as a 
consequence, are mutually exclusive), Solomon, Hindy, Altmann, & Thompson-Schill 
(2015) ran a study in which they had an additional manipulation of token reference (as 
well as the original state change manipulation), i.e. half of their sentence pairs introduced 
a new token in the second sentence (And then, she will smell another onion). The results 
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showed that activation in left pVLPFC increased in response to substantial change 
condition only when the second sentence referred back to the same object token and not 
when it introduced a new object token. This result was interpreted as showing that only 
representations that are mutually exclusive (such as different state representations of the 
same object token) interfere with each other and compete for selection, while state 
representations of distinct tokens don’t interfere. This finding is in line with the idea 
(coming from studies of visual attention) that our cognitive system has a mechanism of 
individuating and keeping track of object tokens independent of their visual properties, 
i.e. two identical objects with the same perceptual properties can still be recognized and 
maintained as two separate entities (Pylyshyn, 2001). Under the account of visual 
indexing developed by Pylyshyn (2001), an individual token gets assigned a visual index 
which makes it possible to keep track of this token over time and represent it as a single 
entity despite changes in its location and visual properties. However, this line of research 
doesn’t address the nature of representational content which is being tracked and neural 
mechanisms by which such representations are built and maintained.   
To summarize, experiments by Hindy et al (2012) and Solomon et al (2015) 
suggest that our comprehension system keeps track of different instantiations of an object 
which interfere with each other upon the object’s subsequent mentions and these 
representations don’t interfere with the representations of newly introduced objects of the 
same type.  Localization of this effect, in pVLPFC which is known to be sensitive to conflict 
resolution, suggests that the processing cost might be due to competition between 
several incompatible representations of the same object. However, such competition is 
 7 
perhaps not a unitary process and may rely on multiple sub-processes such as selective 
attention, suppression, updating of the current cognitive state, etc that get carried out in 
response to the trigger stimulus, in our case, the token which has undergone change. 
Due to the poor temporal resolution of fMRI, it is impossible to establish the dynamics of 
these processes and where in the sentence they occur. Moreover, as these processes 
unfold, they do so dynamically, meaning that at whichever point in the sentence we might 
begin to see their unfolding, they may unfold not just across time (waxing and waning in 
intensity, perhaps) but also across electrode space. EEG, unlike fMRI, provides greater 
temporal resolution and could in principle allow us to inspect the dynamics of 
representation retrieval under the magnifying glass.  
EEG for studying cognition 
EEG is a popular methodology in psycholinguistic research. Traditionally, 
psycholinguistics has focused on event-related potentials (ERPs), which are computed 
by averaging time-locked segments of the EEG signal across multiple trials. ERP is a 
measure of purely evoked activity and a lot of information is lost during the averaging 
across multiple trials. An alternative to ERP are time-frequency representations 
(measures of intensity of different frequency components in the EEG signal), and these 
could be a more sensitive measure because (i) they preserve induced activity which might 
be different between our substantial and minimal change scenarios, (ii) this measure 
includes the additional dimension of frequency and (iii) there is a rich literature relating 
fluctuations of power at different frequencies over time to domain-general cognitive 
processes such as memory encoding and retrieval, inhibition, attention, maintenance of 
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representations and their integration into the current context, etc. all of which could be 
implicated in the process of retrieving representations of objects that have been in 
multiple states.  
Traditionally, frequencies in the EEG signal are organized into 5 bands: delta (1-3 
Hz), theta (4-7 Hz), alpha (8-12 Hz), beta (13-30 Hz), gamma (>30 Hz). Neural activity at 
all these bands has been implicated in different cognitive processes across varying 
paradigms and modalities, as well as having been found to be sensitive to syntactic and 
semantic manipulations in sentence-level comprehension tasks. Below, we provide an 
outline of functional processes associated with each frequency band with a specific focus 
on brain oscillatory dynamics during sentence-processing. As we review theories of brain 
oscillations and cognition, we discuss whether these theories could account for one or 
more aspects of our findings on interfering object-states. 
Neural oscillations and cognition 
The time-frequency analysis of neural activity allows us to look at brain oscillations 
over time.  Increases in power at certain frequencies indicate synchronization of the 
neural activity at that frequency, decreases in power indicate desynchronization. Terms 
such as de/synchronization can be used to describe either long-range coordination 
between different nodes of the same functional network or synchrony of neurons at a local 
level (for discussion, see Bastiaansen & Hagoort, 2006). To examine the former, a 
coherence analysis is necessary. Here we use time-frequency analysis to examine the 
latter, i.e. local synchrony which occurs when large populations of neurons synchronize 
their activity, and this signal becomes strong enough to propagate through the brain tissue 
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and skull and reach the electrodes. Whether the results of this analysis indicate that a 
known physiological mechanism that produces the oscillation in the brain (such as 
hippocampal theta rhythm, for example) is at play is a difficult question and perhaps only 
in-vivo recordings of brain electrical activity can give a direct answer to it (for discussion, 
see Cohen, 2014, pp.270-272). However, using indirect techniques such as M/EEG 
across multiple paradigms and modalities to study the healthy human brain may bring us 
closer to understanding the functional role of brain electrical dynamics at different 
frequencies. The hope is that combining this knowledge with the evidence obtained using 
in vivo techniques will ultimately help us discover the neurophysiological mechanisms 
underlying brain function.  
On the one hand, the EEG literature investigating the neural correlates of brain 
function using the time-frequency analysis is huge. On the other hand, the phenomenon 
we are particularly interested in – the dynamic building, maintaining and retrieving of 
object-states representations – is part of a novel theory of event representation, itself 
based on a novel phenomenon (Hindy et al., 2012, are the first to report it) and it would 
be no exaggeration to say that until now there have been no EEG experiments which 
have directly tested the predictions of this theory. Thus, we treat this study as exploratory. 
However, we can draw some broad predictions from the literature on oscillations and 
language comprehension broadly and sentence processing specifically (since in the 
present study events were described by language), memory encoding and retrieval (since 
discourse comprehension requires constant retrieving of representations from semantic 
memory and their grounding in the episodic context of the discourse) as well as inhibition 
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and attention (since we believe that these processes could be differentially manipulated 
by our state change and reference manipulations). 
Beta and Gamma Oscillations 
Using time-frequency analysis for studying the neural correlates of different 
aspects of language comprehension doesn’t have a very long history; however, this 
approach is gaining pace. Studies on sentence processing have mostly employed 
syntactic violations (of gender and number agreement, word category, phrase structure, 
verb tense) and semantic anomalies. There is an emerging pattern of results such that 
syntactic violations elicit a decrease in beta power compared to correct sentences 
(Bastiaansen, Magyari, & Hagoort, 2010; Davidson & Indefrey, 2007; Lewis, Lemhӧfer, 
Schoffelen, & Schriefers, 2016; Kielar, Meltzer, Moreno, Alain, & Bialystok, 2014; Kielar, 
Panamsky, Links, & Meltzer, 2015) while semantic anomalies lead to decrease in gamma 
(Bastiaansen et al, 2010; Bastiaansen and Hagoort, 2015; Vignali, Himmelstoss, 
Hawelka, Richlan, & Hutzler, 2016; Penolazzi, Angrilli, & Job, 2009; Rommers, Dijkstra, 
& Bastiaansen, 2013; Wang, Zhu, & Bastiaansen, 2012). Even though the experimental 
stimuli in the present study don’t contain any violations, the predictive coding framework 
developed by Lewis and Bastiaansen (2015) accounts for the above described findings 
and generalizes the mechanisms involved for processing violations to sentence-level 
meaning comprehension which makes these beta and gamma effects more relevant for 
our question of interest. Lewis and Bastiaansen emphasize the hierarchical aspect of 
information processing during language comprehension: higher-level representations of 
meaning or structure are built as lower-level units are processed. Anticipation is an 
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essential component of this workflow because in constraining contexts higher-level 
representations are pre-activated ahead of the incoming lower-level information and top-
down predictions are being propagated down the processing stream. According to the 
predictive coding framework, a violation or anomaly serves as a cue to the language 
comprehension system that the meaning or structure representation built so far is 
problematic in some way and must be reconsidered. The framework accounts for the beta 
effects described above by suggesting that beta activity is associated with the 
maintenance of such sentence-level meaning representation under construction and 
propagation of top-down predictions: beta power increases as the sentence unfolds and 
decreases upon encountering a violation. Lower and middle gamma frequency (~30-60 
Hz) reflects matching between top-down predictions and incoming linguistic input: gamma 
is higher when the pre-activated representation matches the bottom-up input which is the 
case of sentences which end with a very high cloze probability word, as demonstrated by 
Wang et al, 2012. Higher gamma (>60 Hz) might be involved for lateral inhibition of 
competing representations (for experimental evidence, see Nieuwland & Martin, 2017).  
So what is the link between the above discussed findings and predictive coding 
framework on the one hand and our object-state change manipulation on the other? We 
believe that when the discourse describes an event that results in change of the object 
state, representations of the object in its different states are being maintained throughout 
discourse comprehension. Comparing scenarios which describe change (chop the onion) 
to those which don’t (smell the onion) means that we are comparing two qualitatively (and 
possibly quantitatively) different meaning representations, with that of the changed object 
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being “richer” and having more details (because the end state of the object which 
underwent substantial change differs from its initial state on one or more featural 
dimensions and, under our account, both such feature sets are retained). Thus, beta 
frequency which, according to Lewis and Bastiaansen, reflects maintenance of the 
sentence-level meaning representation, might distinguish between two such sets of 
representations, especially in scenarios which require our comprehension system to 
switch from the current token to instantiate a new one (as in And then, she will weigh 
another onion): switching from the intact onion to a new instance of an onion (presumably, 
also intact) might be less problematic than switching from a “richer” representation. Under 
the predictive coding account, we could also expect effects in low and middle gamma 
because there might be differences in how likely the event in the second sentence to 
follow substantial and minimal change events described in the first sentence.  
High gamma could in principle also be relevant for the present study. Nieuwland 
and Martin (2017) have reported the results of time-frequency analysis of 4 EEG studies 
which all investigated oscillatory correlates of anaphoric reference. Results of these 4 
studies which varied in modality (auditory/visual), language (Dutch, Spanish, English) and 
type of referential expression (noun phrase/pronoun) showed increased gamma activity 
for referentially coherent expressions compared with expressions that had either more 
than one or no antecedents. The case of referential ambiguity where there is more than 
one antecedent for the referential expression is similar to our case of multiple object states 
where there is more than one state for the object which underwent change. Our minimal 
change condition is similar to the case of referentially coherent expressions from 
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Nieuwland and Martin, thus we might expect higher gamma in the minimal change 
(referentially coherent) condition compared to the substantial change (referentially 
problematic) condition. There is however a difference between the referential ambiguity 
and state change cases: in the former, ambiguity is between different tokens, in the latter 
is it between different states of the same token. Results of fMRI studies on referential 
ambiguity and object-states competition effect don’t converge. As has been discussed 
above, comprehending events which entail change leads to increased activation in LIFG 
– an effect interpreted as indicating conflict between multiple competing representations 
(Hindy et al, 2012; Solomon et al, 2015). Referential ambiguity did not elicit increases in 
LIFG activation, but instead lead to increased activation in medial and bilateral parietal, 
medial frontal and right superior frontal regions (Nieuwland et al, 2007) – brain areas 
associated with problem-solving. The authors interpreted this effect as indicating that 
selecting the correct antecedent relies not on resolving competition between several 
potential referents, but instead on inference- and decision making for solving the problem. 
If EEG and time-frequency analysis are sensitive to the same processes as fMRI, then 
we shouldn’t expect the results of the present analysis to converge with those of 
Nieuwland and Martin. However, it could be the case that gamma is sensitive to neither 
problem solving nor conflict resolution, but instead to some cognitive processes shared 
between processing referential ambiguity and comprehending change in which case we 
might expect gamma effect. 
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Theta Oscillations 
Theta frequency has also been implicated in sentence processing and is 
responsive to semantic manipulations, such as semantic anomalies (Davidson 
& Indefrey, 2007; Bastiaansen and Hagoort, 2015; Hald, Bastiaansen, & Hagoort, 2006; 
Wang et al, 2012), open vs close-class words comparison (Bastiaansen et al., 2005), 
comparison of words with visual vs auditory semantic properties (Bastiaansen, 
Oostenveld, Jensen, & Hagoort, 2008), which suggests that theta activity might be 
associated with lexical-semantic retrieval. Theta frequency has also been extensively 
studied outside the sentence processing domain by memory researchers. For example, 
theta has been implicated in episodic memory encoding and retrieval: theta differentiates 
between items which will be later remembered during the encoding phase and between 
old and new items during the retrieval phase (Klimesch, Doppelmayr, Schimke, & Ripper, 
1997; Klimesch, Doppelmayr, Russegger, & Pachinger, 1996; Burgess & Gruzelier, 1997) 
and increases with increased memory load (Jensen & Tesche, 2002), for a review, see 
Klimesch, Schack, & Sauseng, 2005. In our paradigm, maintaining multiple or more 
complex representations of an object in its different states might lead to higher memory 
load and potentially induce increase in theta at retrieval in the state change condition 
compared to the minimal change condition.  
Alpha Oscillations 
Finally, alpha is perhaps the most extensively studied frequency in the human 
EEG. A well-known oscillatory signature of information processing is alpha suppression. 
Since its discovery by Hans Berger in the late 1920s, it has been replicated many times. 
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The basic finding is that alpha desynchronizes when the eyes are open compared to when 
the eyes are closed. In language-related tasks, alpha desynchronization has been found 
in response to semantic judgement tasks (Röhm, Klimesch, Haider, & Doppelmayr, 2001; 
Klimesch, Doppelmayr, Pachinger, & Russegger, 1997) and syntactic violations 
(Bastiaansen et al, 2010; Davidson & Indefrey, 2007; Kielar et al, 2014; Kielar et al, 2015). 
But the general finding is that alpha desynchronizes for active information processing. 
Somewhat paradoxically, in memory tasks involving retention of items, alpha power 
increases proportionally to the number of items which need to be maintained in memory 
(Jensen, Gelfand, Kounios, & Lisman, 2002; Tuladhar et al, 2007; Klimesch, Doppelmayr, 
Schwaiger, Auinger, & Winkler, 1999). The gating by inhibition hypothesis (Jensen & 
Mazaheri, 2010) as well as the inhibition-timing hypothesis (Klimesch, Sauseng, & 
Hanslmayr, 2007) account for this paradox taking into account the timing and topography 
of alpha effects. According to these two very similar theories, alpha increase indicates 
inhibition of task-irrelevant brain areas or functional networks which facilitates information 
processing in relevant areas/networks. If EEG will be sensitive to the effect found with 
fMRI (object-states competition effect), we might expect effects in the alpha frequency 
(because resolving competition requires inhibition of the irrelevant object-state). 
There are also delta oscillations which are generated in sleep, but are also 
modulated by the reward system and saliency of the target (Knyazev, 2007), but it is 
difficult to relate these to the present study, and thus we are neither reviewing nor 
including delta in the actual analysis. 
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The present study 
In the present study, we want to investigate how representations of objects in their 
different states are built, maintained and retrieved as language unfolds, as well as how 
our comprehension system switches from processing one token to instantiating a 
representation of a different token of the same type.  We manipulated the amount of 
change an object undergoes (and, as a consequence, complexity of history associated 
with the object), as well as the referent of the unfolding discourse (whether the same or 
another token is being referred back to): The chef will weigh/chop the onion. And then, 
she will smell the/another onion. We measured participants’ EEG while they read pairs of 
sentences. Given that EEG power fluctuations in theta, alpha, beta and gamma 
frequencies have been implicated in processes which could also be employed for tracking 
objects through unfolding language, we expected oscillations at one or more of these 
frequency bands to be sensitive to our manipulations. 
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METHODS 
Participants 
Thirty-seven participants were recruited from the student population at the 
University of Connecticut in accordance to the IRB approval. They received course credit 
for their participation. Six participants were eliminated due to technical problems 
(equipment and script failure). The remaining 31 participants (19 females; age range = 
18-22 years) were native speakers of English, right-handed, had normal or corrected to 
normal vision and hearing, and no history of neurological disorders. Data from several 
more participants had to be discarded after preprocessing due to excessive EEG artifact 
(details are provided below). 
Materials and design 
Each participant completed 320 trials. Experimental stimuli (N=160) were designed 
to elicit the intersecting object-states effect and appeared in 4 conditions (40 sentences 
per condition) in a 2 by 2 design (see Table 1 for the summary of conditions). All 
experimental items consisted of two parts. In the first sentence, we manipulated the 
degree of change the object underwent as a result of someone or something acting upon 
it, e.g. The chef will weigh the onion (minimal change) or The chef will chop the onion 
(substantial change). State change ratings were collected in a separate on-line norming 
study (described below). The verbs were matched in length and frequency1. In the second 
sentence, we manipulated the token reference, i.e. the sentence either referred back to 
 
1 All frequency values were obtained using the SUBTL Word Frequency database (Brysbaert and New, 2009)). 
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the previously introduced token (And then, she will smell the onion) or introduced a new 
token of the same type (And then, she will smell another onion).  
Filler sentences (N=160) were designed to potentially (i) elicit transient lexical and 
referential ambiguity effects and (ii) reduce predictability of the object in the second 
sentence. Lexical and referential ambiguity are of interest to us since they also arise in 
cases when there is more than one representation bound to the lexical item, just like in 
the case of objects which have undergone a significant change of state (and any further 
reference to such objects could lead to transient ambiguity between different states). It 
could be that processing the object which has been in two distinct states relies on the 
same mechanisms as resolving lexical and/or referential ambiguity which would be 
reflected in similar EEG patterns for all these types of ambiguity. However, there is one 
major difference between lexical and referential ambiguity on the one hand and states 
ambiguity on the other, with the latter being between two representations of the same 
instance of an object token and the former – between representations of different objects. 
Taking into account this difference as well as the fact that in our filler sentences the critical 
entity is mentioned only once (and not later referred back to), processing a lexically or 
referentially ambiguous entity would require an inference about which referent is more 
likely given the context, whereas processing the critical entity from the main experimental 
conditions would require retrieving that item’s history. Processing these different types of 
ambiguities could rely on different mechanisms and engage different brain areas, and 
thus result in different EEG patterns.  
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As mentioned above, filler sentences also served the purpose of reducing 
predictability of the object in the second sentence. Eighty filler sentences had the same 
structure as experimental stimuli, however they introduced a new object type in the 
second part (e.g. The woman will wash the floor. And then, she will unroll the carpet). Half 
of these stimuli (N=40) had a lexically ambiguous item in the second sentence (e.g. The 
woman will wash the floor. And then, she will unroll the runner). We manipulated the 
context in order to bias the ambiguous items towards the less dominant meaning and thus 
create transient competition between the dominant meaning and the contextually biased 
subordinate meaning (meaning dominance was based on the norming studies by Elston-
Guettler & Friederici, 2004; Gorfein, Viviani, & Leddo, 1982; Nelson, McEvoy, Walling, & 
Wheeler, 1980; Titone, 1998). The sentences were designed this way in order to make 
them elicit transient uncertainty rather than unresolved ambiguity because the former is 
more similar to a conflict elicited by multiple states of an object. Nouns in the second 
sentence were matched on length and frequency.  
Finally, we also included 80 filler sentences with two clauses within a single 
sentence. Half of them (N=40) were designed to elicit referential ambiguity, such as John 
valued Edward because he was very knowledgeable, where he can refer to both John 
and Edward. We used the implicit causality database provided by Ferstl et al (2010) to 
choose the verbs which had a 70% bias either towards NP1 (N=20) or NP2 (N=20) to 
make sure that the ambiguity is resolved. Again, such transient ambiguity is more similar 
to the ambiguity arising from the competing objects states which is also transient and 
resolved in favor of the state relevant in the context of the sentence. The rest of these 
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filler sentences (N=40) were designed in such a way that the pronoun selectively pointed 
to either actor or patient of the sentence (e.g. Daphne valued Edward because he was 
very knowledgeable).  
We didn’t run additional norming for the lexical and referential ambiguity 
sentences; the results of the analyses performed on these sentences should therefore be 
interpreted with caution.  
Condition 
Code 
Condition Example 
Experimental sentences 
1 Minimal Change, Same Object Token 
The chef will smell the onion. And then, she 
will weigh the onion. 
2 Substantial Change, Same Object Token 
The chef will chop the onion. And then, she 
will weigh the onion. 
3 Minimal Change, Another Object Token 
The chef will smell the onion. And then, she 
will weigh another onion. 
4 Substantial Change, Another Object Token 
The chef will chop the onion. And then, she 
will weigh another onion. 
 Filler sentences 
5 Lexically Ambiguous The woman will wash the floor. And then, she will unroll the runner. 
6 Lexically Unambiguous (control for 5) 
The woman will wash the floor. And then, 
she will unroll the carpet. 
7 Referentially Ambiguous John valued Edward because he was very knowledgeable. 
8 Referentially Unambiguous (control for 7) 
Daphne valued Edward because he was 
very knowledgeable. 
 
Table 1. Examples of the experimental and filler sentences for each condition. 
 
To summarize, each subject was presented with 320 trials, split across 8 
conditions (4 critical, 4 filler), with 40 items in each condition. All sentences were 
counterbalanced across four experimental lists using a Latin square design and pseudo-
randomized so that there were no more than three consecutive trials from the same 
condition.  
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Change ratings 
Change ratings for the actions described in the first sentence of each experimental 
sentence pair were collected on-line using Qualtrics software. There were 160 sentence 
pairs, yielding a total of 320 first sentences, evenly split between substantial and minimal 
change conditions, resulting in 160 sentences per condition which were further split 
across 4 stimuli lists, so that each participant saw only one version of each sentence (i.e. 
describing either substantial or minimal change). Participants (N=159) were asked to rate 
how much the object changes as a result of the action described on a scale from 1 (no 
change) to 7 (big change). Sentences in the minimal change condition received an 
average rating of 2.17 (sd = 0.86), sentences in the substantial change condition received 
an average rating of 4.31 (sd = 0.97). Thus, there was a significant difference between 
the average change ratings for the substantial and minimal change conditions (t = -19.9, 
df=159, p<0.001). A post-hoc item analysis showed that there were 4 sentences with 
reverse change ratings. They were removed from the analysis (thus instead of 160 
experimental trials per person, there were 156 trials). The distribution of responses is 
illustrated in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1. State change ratings. 
Plausibility ratings 
Sentence pairs in the substantial and minimal change conditions differed only by 
the verb (and, as a consequence, event) in the first sentences, while the second sentence 
was kept constant across conditions. To see whether the event described in the second 
sentences was equally likely to follow substantial or minimal change events, we collected 
ratings (using Qualtrics software) for the likelihood that the second sentence of each 
sentence pair would follow the first sentence. Items were split into 4 lists with an equal 
amount of (randomized) substantial and minimal change items in each condition. 
Participants (N~26) were asked to rate How likely is it that the event described in the 
second sentence would follow the event described in the first sentence? on a scale from 
1 (very unlikely) to 7 (very likely). For the same token reference, sentence pairs in the 
minimal change condition received an average plausibility rating of 5.19 (sd = 0.93), 
sentence pairs in the substantial change condition received an average plausibility rating 
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of 4.93 (sd = 1.02). For another token reference, sentence pairs in the minimal change 
condition received an average plausibility rating of 3.51 (sd = 0.77), sentence pairs in the 
substantial change condition received an average plausibility rating of 3.63 (sd = 0.87). 
Thus, events involving substantial change were rated as less likely to be followed by 
events described in the second sentence than events involving minimal change 
(p=0.0004 for the same and p=0.03 for another token reference). We return to this issue 
in the Results and Discussion sections.  
Procedure 
Before the experiment, participants were asked to read and sign a consent form 
and fill out the demographic information forms. Together with the subject preparation (see 
EEG Data Acquisition section) this part took approximately 30 minutes. 
The experiment took place in a sound-attenuated chamber. Participants were 
asked to read sentences and answer comprehension questions, while trying to minimize 
movements and blinks during sentence presentation. The experiment started with 10 
practice trials, followed by 320 experimental and filler items, split into 8 blocks. Sentences 
were presented on a Dell monitor using PsychoPy software (Pierce, 2007). Subjects were 
seated 80 cm away from the screen. Each trial started with a black fixation box presented 
for 1300 msec on a grey background, in the center of the screen. Sentences were then 
presented one word at a time with words presented in a yellow font inside the fixation box 
at a fixed rate. Each word was presented for 300 msec, followed by an interstimulus 
interval (ISI) of 300 msec. After the last word of the sentence disappeared from the 
screen, the blank fixation box remained on the screen for 1000 msec. 12% of trials were 
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followed by yes/no comprehension questions (N=39). Participants were instructed to 
press the “f” and “j” keys on a keyboard to give their responses and to use the “j” key to 
proceed to another sentence whenever they felt ready. After every block, they were given 
feedback about their progress (i.e. how many sentences were read, how many were left, 
how many comprehension questions were answered correctly). Accuracy for the 
comprehension questions was used as an indication that participants read the sentences 
carefully. On average, performance accuracy was 94%. The time on task was 
approximately 1 hour 20 minutes. 
EEG data acquisition 
EEG was recorded using a 256-channel HydroCel Geodesic Sensor Net at a 
sampling rate of 1000 Hz. The data were amplified using a Net Amps 400 Amplifier 
(Electrical Geodesics, Inc., Eugene, OR). Recordings were referenced on-line to Cz and 
re-referenced off-line to the average of all channels. There were no on-line filters. 
Impedances were set below 50 kO.  
Data preprocessing 
Preprocessing and analyses were performed using the Fieldtrip toolbox for Matlab 
(Oostenveld, Fries, Maris, & Schoffelen, 2011). A high-pass filter at 0.1 Hz and a low-
pass filter at 55 Hz were applied to the continuous data. Then, epochs ranging from 1750 
msec before and 2200 msec after the critical word (see below) onset were extracted with 
a 30 msec offset (because additional testing showed that our stimuli appeared on the 
screen with a ~30 msec delay). Even though the final analysis was performed on shorter 
epochs, preprocessing was done on longer time-windows to provide sufficient data 
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padding for the subsequent time-frequency analysis. In the experimental conditions, 
preprocessing was time-locked to the noun phrase in the second sentence, e.g. And then, 
she will weigh the/another onion (however, noun phrases were later split into separate 
determiner and noun trials for the final analysis, see below for more details). In the lexical 
ambiguity condition, the critical word was the last noun in the second sentence, e.g. And 
then, unroll the carpet/runner. In the referential ambiguity condition, the critical word was 
the pronoun, e.g. John valued Edward because he was very knowledgeable.  
To maximize reproducibility, we tried to use automatic approaches for data 
preprocessing whenever it was possible. After segmentation, the data were demeaned 
and resampled at 500 Hz. Next, bad channels were automatically identified (channels 
were classified as contaminated if their variance exceeded a z threshold of 1). Such 
channels were removed from the data and interpolated using spline interpolation. The 
average number of removed channels per person was 9.7 (~4%), however it varied 
substantially among individuals (sd = 7.7). Next, a principal components analysis reduced 
the dimensionality of our data to 60 components, on which an independent components 
analysis was performed. Blinks, eye-movements and the remaining line noise 
components were identified manually (this was the only subjective step in the entire 
routine) and removed from the data. On average, 3.1 components were removed per 
participant (sd = 1.4). Finally, the data were re-referenced to the average of all channels 
(and Cz channel was recovered through this procedure, which resulted in a total of 257 
channels). Ideally, reference sites shouldn’t pick up brain activity. In reality, this is not the 
case and even electrodes at the mastoids or earlobes (which often serve as a reference) 
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can pick up activity from the temporal lobe or muscle-related artifacts (for more details, 
see the discussion of the no-Switzerland principle by Luck (2014), pp.151-165). 
Moreover, in high-density systems such as ours if we were to choose mastoid channels 
as a reference, some recording sites would be too close to the reference channels and 
activity recorded at such sites would be similar to those of the reference channels. On the 
other hand, given that “the integral of negative and positive potential fields in a conducting 
sphere sums to exactly zero” (Dien, 1998, p. 35), we used average reference to take 
advantage of the fact that 256 channels allow for decent sampling of the head surface 
potential and thus could be used as an approximation of a true zero. 
The remaining preprocessing steps (i.e. de-trending and threshold-based artifact 
rejection) were performed for experimental and filler items separately (because length of 
the segments of interest varied for experimental and filler trials). Below are the details of 
the remaining preprocessing steps and analysis parameters for the experimental trials. 
Further information about the preprocessing and analysis of the filler items, as well as the 
discussion of results is provided in Appendix C. 
Choice of the critical word and baseline period 
One aim of the present study was to investigate the dynamics of the interaction 
between multiple representations of the same object. Our region of interest, therefore, is 
the end of the second sentence of each sentence pair, where the object which was 
introduced in the first sentence is referred back to again. However, since (i) we used 
RSVP paradigm and presented strictly one word at a time (so a determiner and a noun 
were presented separately) and (ii) given the fact that the noun from the first sentence 
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was repeated in the second sentence on most trials2 (e.g. The chef will smell the onion. 
And then, she will weigh the onion.), we assumed that participants would anticipate the 
ending of the sentence and any potential effects could emerge even before presentation 
of the final noun, i.e. at the determiner (c.f. the anticipatory processes observed by 
Altmann & Kamide, 1999; DeLong, Urbach, & Kutas, 2005). For this reason, we split each 
trial, time-locked to the determiner and lasting until the offset of the final noun, into 
separate determiner and noun epochs for further preprocessing and analysis.  
Since we are interested in the effect of retrieval of a target representation (and 
potential conflict due to multiple competing representations of the object in its different 
states), we chose the verb before the final noun as our baseline. This ensures that any 
differential activation in response to the critical words (i.e. determiner and noun) in the 
substantial and minimal change conditions is due to the retrieval and not maintenance of 
object’s multiple states.  
Trials time-locked to the determiner 
We redefined experimental trials to include 850 msec before and 860 msec after 
the determiner onset which would allow us to look at the power spectrum associated with 
the determiner in the time-window of 600 msec before and 600 msec after the determiner 
(given the parameters of the time-frequency analysis, see below). After removing the 
linear trend from the trials and running automatic artifact rejection, we eliminated 
 
3 25% of trials – these were filler items designed to elicit referential ambiguity and their controls – consisted of one sentence 
and all had the same sentential pattern, e.g. <John valued Edward> because s/he <was very knowledgeable>, where the agent and 
the patient were always proper names. 75% of trials had the following structure: The <agent> will <perform an action on the object>. 
And then, s/he will <perform another action on the/another object> of which two thirds had a repeating noun. If we believe that 
participants were sensitive to this distribution of items (for example, a proper name could serve as a cue that the trial will consist of 
one sentence) and anticipated repetition of the noun on only two-sentence trials, then we could expect participants to have an even 
stronger expectation that the noun will be repeated (since it was true for ~66% of two-sentence pairs) which could lead to early effects 
at the determiner. 
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participants (N=8) who had more than 50% of trials with activity exceeding the +/-100 mV 
threshold. Approximately 16% of trials were removed from the data of the 23 participants 
who entered the final analysis. The remaining trials were equally distributed among 
conditions (Minimal Change, Same Object Reference = 33, Substantial Change, Same 
Object Reference = 33, Minimal Change, Another Object Reference = 33, Minimal 
Change, Another Object Reference = 33). 
Trials time-locked to the noun 
To compute power on the noun relative to the verb, we extracted 850 msec before 
the determiner (verb-associated activity) and concatenated these epochs with the 860 
msec following the noun onset. We further ran de-trending and automatic artifact rejection 
(using the +/-100 mV threshold) on such concatenated trials. 8 participants who had less 
than 50% of remaining trials were eliminated. Approximately 19% of trials were removed 
from the data of the 23 participants who entered the final analysis. The remaining trials 
were equally distributed among conditions (Minimal Change, Same Object Reference = 
31, Substantial Change, Same Object Reference = 31, Minimal Change, Another Object 
Reference = 31, Minimal Change, Another Object Reference = 32). 
Time-frequency analysis 
To calculate power spectrum in the 4-30 Hz frequency range, a 500 msec long 
time-window and a Hanning taper were used. Power changes were computed in steps of 
10 msec and 2 Hz. To calculate power spectrum in the 30-55 Hz frequency range, a 200 
msec long time-window and a Hanning taper were used. Power changes were computed 
in steps of 10 msec and 5 Hz. Then, time-frequency representations were averaged for 
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each subject, separately for each of the four experimental conditions. Post critical-word 
subject averages were expressed as a relative change from the baseline interval of 600 
to 250 msec before the critical word (which corresponds to verb presentation and 50 msec 
of blank screen following it). A cluster-based random permutation test was used to 
compare the contrasts of interest. 
Statistical analysis 
A cluster-based random permutation approach (Maris & Oostenveld, 2007) was 
used to compare the neural response between conditions. Since this approach only 
allows for pairwise comparisons, the following contrasts were considered and are 
reported (separately for the determiner and noun trials): 
• Same object token 
o Minimal Change vs Substantial Change 
• Another object token 
o Minimal Change vs Substantial Change 
Data points in the 0 to 600 msec time-windows relative to the critical word 
(determiner and noun) onset were entered into the final analysis.  For all conditions, data 
from all 257 EEG channels were included in the analysis. Separate analyses were 
performed for each of the four frequency bands: theta (4-7 Hz), alpha (8-12 Hz), beta (13-
30 Hz) and gamma (30-55 Hz). For every time-frequency-channel data point a dependent 
samples two-tailed t-test was performed to compare activation between conditions. All 
data points which met a significance level of p=0.025 per tail were clustered based on 
temporal adjacency, and a cluster-level statistic was calculated by adding together all t-
values within a cluster. Next, the condition labels were swapped and a t-test was run for 
such permuted samples. This procedure was repeated 1000 times and a histogram was 
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created based on the resulting t-values. If the cluster-level statistic fell within highest or 
lowest 2.5th percentile of the permutation histogram, the effect was said to be significant.  
RESULTS 
See Table 2 for the summary of results for the determiner and noun trials. See 
Appendix C for the summary of results for the filler trials. 
Power changes time-locked to the determiner 
For the same token reference, the cluster-based random permutation test revealed 
a significant difference (p=0.01) between the substantial and minimal change conditions 
in one of the three tested frequency bands, namely in alpha3 (8-12 Hz): there was more 
alpha power in the substantial change condition relative to the minimal change condition. 
The difference was most pronounced between 80 and 510 msec after the determiner 
onset and had a left temporal distribution (see Figure 2). Testing in the theta (4-7 Hz), 
beta (13-30 Hz) and gamma (30-55 Hz) frequency bands didn’t yield significant results.  
For another token reference, the cluster-based random permutation test didn’t 
reveal significant differences between the substantial and minimal change conditions in 
any of the frequency bands. However, testing in the beta frequency band (13-30 Hz) 
revealed a marginally significant difference (p=0.07). In Figure 3 which visualizes the 
results for another token reference, we chose to plot topographies averaged across the 
same time (80-510 msec) and frequency (8-12 Hz) windows in which the difference 
 
3 To make sure that this alpha effect is not due to the differences in plausibility of the second sentence following the first 
sentence between the substantial and minimal change conditions (for more details, see Methods section), we removed 19 items with 
the largest differences in plausibility ratings between the conditions so that the average difference wasn’t significant anymore, 
recomputed time-frequency representations and re-ran statistics on this new reduced dataset. The alpha effect persisted. 
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between the two change conditions (substantial and minimal) was significant for the same 
token reference to allow for comparison of alpha dynamics between the two reference 
conditions (same and another).  
Determiner 0-600 msec 
 SubSame-MinSame SubAnother-MinAnother 
theta (4-7Hz) 0.8 (neg) 0.62 (pos) 
alpha (8-12Hz) 0.01 (pos) 0.43 (pos) 
beta (13-30Hz) 0.39 (pos) 0.07 (neg) 
gamma (30-55Hz) 1 (neg and pos) 0.93 (neg) 
Noun 0-600 msec 
  SubSame-MinSame SubAnother-MinAnother 
theta (4-7Hz) 0.9 (neg) 0.54 (pos) 
alpha (8-12Hz) 0.67 (neg) 0.41 (neg) 
beta (13-30Hz) 0.62 (pos) 0.3 (neg) 
gamma (30-55Hz) 0.63 (pos) 0.52 (pos) 
 
Table 2. Results of the cluster-based random permutation tests for the substantial vs minimal change 
contrast, reported are the smallest p-values. 
Power changes time-locked to the noun 
Cluster-based random permutation test didn’t reveal any significant differences for 
any of the contrasts on the trials time-locked to the noun. For visualization (Figure 4), we 
chose to plot the dynamics of alpha power differences between substantial and minimal 
change conditions for both the same and another token reference because it was the only 
significant effect found on the determiner trials. The pattern of alpha dynamics for both 
reference conditions is qualitatively similar to that of the respective determiner trials; 
however, as has been mentioned already and is reported in Table 2, none of the 
comparisons on the noun trials yielded significant differences. 
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Power changes time-locked to the determiner: same token reference 
 
Figure 2. Time-frequency representations for 
the (A) substantial and (B) minimal change 
conditions, as well as (C) the difference 
between the substantial and minimal change 
conditions for the same token reference. The 
data used for these graphs are an average of 
four representative channels (E69, E70, E74, 
E75) highlighted in (D) – the difference 
topography between the substantial and 
minimal change conditions averaged in the 8-
12 Hz frequency and 80-510 msec time 
windows. (E) The dynamics of alpha (8-12 
Hz) power changes. The color bars represent 
relative power change compared to the 
baseline period spanning from -600 to -250 
msec before the determiner onset. 
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Power changes time-locked to the determiner: another token reference 
 
Figure 3. Time-frequency representations for the (A) 
substantial and (B) minimal change conditions, as well 
as (C) the difference between the substantial and 
minimal change conditions for another token 
reference. The data used for these graphs are an 
average of four representative channels (E69, E70, 
E74, E75) highlighted in (D). Topographies in (D) and 
(E) are averaged for the alpha frequency band (8-12 
Hz) to highlight the absense of effect found for the 
same token reference. The color bars represent 
relative power change compared to the baseline period 
spanning from -600 to -250 msec before the 
determiner onset. 
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Power changes time-locked to the noun 
 
Figure 4. The dynamics of alpha (8-12 Hz) power changes. The color bar represents relative power change 
compared to the baseline ([-600 -250] msec). The difference in activation between the substantial and 
minimal change conditions wasn’t significant. 
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DISCUSSION 
In the present EEG study, we used neural oscillations to study how objects 
introduced into the discourse are tracked during sentence processing. We believe that as 
we comprehend language, these representations are retrieved from semantic memory, 
contextualized in the discourse, and maintained in short-term and episodic memory 
systems as language unfolds. We manipulated how many representations were 
associated with the same token: some scenarios described events which led to significant 
changes in the state of the object, thus more than one representation was now associated 
with the introduced token (before and after change); while other scenarios described 
events which didn’t result in object’s state change, thus one representation was sufficient. 
We also manipulated whether the same token or another token of the same type was 
later referred to in the discourse. This allowed us to compare the neural signatures of 
representing the same object token in its different states (the same onion before and after 
chopping) and several tokens of the same type in different states (e.g. one chopped and 
one intact onion) as well as to address the question whether simply having multiple state 
representations could lead to more effortful processing of the discourse or whether it is 
specifically retrieving the history of the same token and its multiple representations which 
increases the processing effort.  
A time-frequency analysis of EEG, synchronized from the onset of the final 
determiner in the second sentence, revealed a significant increase in alpha power (8-12 
Hz) in the substantial change condition relative to the minimal change condition when the 
sentence referred back to the same object token, but not when the sentence referred to 
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a different instance of an object (see Figures 2 and 3). How can the fact that we didn’t 
find alpha effect for another token reference help us interpret the findings of the present 
study? Conceptually, there is one major difference between processing that happens as 
one reads the final noun phrase which either refers back to the already mentioned item 
or introduces a new item of the same type. To illustrate this difference, let’s get back to 
the examples used in the Introduction,  
1. The chef will chop the onion. And then, she will weigh the onion. 
2. The chef will chop the onion. And then, she will weigh another onion. 
In (1), processing the event of chopping the onion in the first sentence requires 
thinking about the onion before and after change, thus representations of the onion in 
both states are available. However, any further reference to this instance of an onion 
requires selection of one of these representations (given the context in (1), it should be 
the chopped onion) since they are mutually exclusive – the object can’t be in two different 
states simultaneously, unless we are talking about Schroedinger’s cat. Such clash of 
representations leads to competition, as demonstrated by increased activation in VLPFC 
in substantial compared to minimal change condition (Hindy et al, 2012; Solomon et al, 
2015). In (2), representations of the initial and end states of the onion are also required 
to process the event of chopping, however the state of another onion introduced in the 
second sentence does not interfere with either of the states of the “old” onion, because 
their representations are not mutually exclusive and can coexist, thus no competition is 
elicited (as also demonstrated in Solomon et al (2015) – Stroop-sensitive voxels weren’t 
differentially activated in substantial and minimal change conditions whenever the second 
sentence introduced a new item). While fMRI studies mentioned above looked at the 
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Stroop-sensitive voxels and interpreted the difference between substantial and minimal 
change conditions in terms of competition between object-states, we can try to 
decompose the notion of competition into inhibition and selection components and 
interpret our EEG alpha effect as indicating inhibition of the irrelevant token state which 
is required for selecting the relevant one. 
Since the initial discovery of alpha rhythms in the human EEG in 1920s and for a 
long time since then, increases in alpha have been associated with cortical idling, while 
alpha decreases were believed to support active information processing. However, since 
the more recent studies on memory load and retention found that alpha power increases 
proportionally to the amount of items that need to be retained in memory (e.g. Jensen et 
al., 2002; Tuladhar et al., 2007), the role of alpha oscillations for cognition has been 
reconsidered. While Jensen et al (2002) and Tuladhar et al (2007) studies examined 
alpha during the retention period, the study by Waldhauser, Johansson, & Hanslmayr, 
2012 investigated oscillatory signatures of retrieval of competing visual memories, which 
is more directly relatable to the present study. Participants in their study were presented 
with abstract line drawings (cues) associated with rectangles of different colors (targets) 
presented to the right and left visual fields (RVF and LVF, respectively). Half of the shapes 
were paired with rectangles of the same color (non-interference condition), another half 
were paired with rectangles of different colors (interference condition). During the 
selective retrieval test phase the participants were presented with a cue and a white 
rectangular either in RVF or LVF and asked to covertly retrieve (imagine) the color of the 
box associated with that cue and visual field. EEG recorded during the selective retrieval 
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test was analyzed in the time-frequency domain and showed that there was an increase 
in alpha/beta power in the interference condition compared to the non-interference 
condition. When targets associated with the cue drawing were of the same color (non-
interference condition), no such alpha/beta increase was observed. We believe that our 
object-states interference effect is similar in nature to this effect of interfering visual 
memories. A token which underwent a change of state has (at least) two distinct 
representations (and as a consequence, two distinct features sets associated with them) 
now bound to it, just like in the Waldhauser et al study, a cue in the interference condition 
is also associated with two representations differing on the color dimension. However, the 
study by Waldhauser et al had this additional visual field manipulation since they were 
interested in the lateralization of the effect. And indeed, the alpha/beta increase was 
found over the hemisphere associated with the competitor, and not the target item. They 
explain this finding in terms of the inhibition gating hypothesis formalized by Jensen and 
Mazaheri in their 2010 paper. According to this theory, information is gated by inhibiting 
the task-irrelevant areas of the brain, and this inhibition is implemented via alpha 
oscillations. For example, studies of spatial attention found increases in alpha over the 
hemisphere ipsilateral to the hemifield to which attention was directed (e.g. Thut, Nietzel, 
Brandt, & Pascual-Leone, 2006; Händel, Haarmeier, & Jensen, 2010). Taken together, 
these findings suggest that alpha is important for inhibition (of either competing memories 
or task-irrelevant regions), and this suppression of irrelevant information or brain areas 
facilitates processing of relevant information. If we reiterate this statement in the context 
of our study, suppression of irrelevant object-state facilitates activation of the relevant 
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one. However, the topography of our effect – which spans left fronto-temporal electrodes, 
right above VLPFC – doesn’t straightforwardly fit under the gating inhibition hypothesis if 
we believe that the alpha effect is reflective of the VLPFC effect reported in Hindy et al 
(2012) and Solomon et al (2015). Under Hindy and Solomon account, VLPFC is activated 
to a higher extent for processing competing object-states. Under the gating inhibition 
account, areas generating synchronized alpha oscillations are the ones which need to be 
inhibited for processing the critical information. If for a moment we assume that sensor-
space is representative of the underlying brain space and that the alpha increase that we 
observe in the present study indeed has its sources in the left inferior frontal areas (based 
on the topography of the effect), then according to the gating inhibition hypothesis, these 
areas are inhibited to facilitate processing in other areas which might be more critical for 
our manipulation. It could be that our effect is not reflective of the VLPFC effect reported 
in earlier fMRI studies and thus this explanation would totally be possible. Or it could also 
be that our assumption that the observed topography reflects activation in VLPFC is 
wrong, which could very well be the case because (i) sensor space doesn’t map directly 
onto brain space and (ii) we didn’t run any additional analyses to localize out effect. To 
summarize the discussion we had so far, interference between multiple object-states 
should logically lead to inhibition of the irrelevant state, and alpha synchronization we 
observe in the substantial change condition might signal such inhibition given the previous 
findings connecting alpha and inhibition. Additional analyses are required to make a 
stronger connection between the EEG and fMRI findings.  
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We also found a marginally significant (p=0.07) decrease in beta (13-30 Hz) power 
at the determiner in the substantial change condition relative to the minimal change 
condition when the discourse introduced a new object token in the second sentence. As 
discussed in the introduction, beta activity is associated with maintenance of sentence-
level meaning representation under construction and propagation of top-down predictions 
(Lewis and Bastiaansen, 2015): beta power increases as the sentence unfolds and 
decreases upon encountering a violation or any other cue signaling that the structure built 
so far must be reconsidered. Introducing a new token of the same type (as is the case of 
another token reference condition) could serve as such a cue to the comprehension 
system that the meaning built so far must be revised and the focus should be switched to 
the new token. Revising the meaning in the substantial change condition is perhaps more 
effortful simply because the representation of the event there has more detail than in the 
minimal change condition, and this fact could be reflected in decrease in beta in the 
substantial compared to minimal change condition. However, since this effect is marginal, 
we are not further discussing it here.  
Analysis of filler items designed to elicit referential and lexical ambiguity didn’t yield 
any significant results (for the summary of results, see Appendix C). The pattern of 
activation associated with referentially and lexically ambiguous items didn’t resemble that 
associated with the object change manipulation. Thus, the results of the statistical 
analysis and visual inspection of the filler items suggest that interference resulting from 
multiple competing object-states representations is not the same as the interference 
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between multiple interfering antecedents for the pronoun or multiple meanings for the 
lexically ambiguous items. 
While spatial resolution is not what people usually look for when using EEG, 
temporal resolution definitely is. Any assumptions about the timing of the fMRI effect 
reported by Hindy et al and Solomon et al was possible only because of comparing across 
several experiments. Using EEG in the present study allowed us to time-lock to the 
window of interest, specifically the last noun phrase in the second sentence, to directly 
test what happens at the retrieval. We found an effect at the determiner and no effect at 
the noun. We believe that this happened because of the nature of our stimuli set, where 
in 50% of all trials the noun in the second sentence was the same as in the first sentence 
(e.g. The chef will smell the onion. And then, she will weigh the onion.), which made it 
very easy for the participants to anticipate the ending of sentence pairs. Thus, the cloze 
probability of sentence endings was really high, not because of semantically restricting 
context of the sentence itself, but because of the frequent pattern in our stimuli. Under 
such conditions effect at the determiner is not surprising. And, in fact, there are studies 
(e.g. DeLong et al, 2005) demonstrating ERP effects at the articles preceding the critical 
words in contexts with high cloze probability of the final word.  
EEG (unlike fMRI) also allows for exploration of the dynamics of the state-change 
effect. Figure 2E shows the dynamics of alpha power changes for the substantial vs 
minimal change contrast for the same token reference. We can see that the differences 
emerge first rather focally separately over the left and right hemispheres around 100 msec 
after the determiner onset; at around 300 msec they are distributed almost over the entire 
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scalp and at around 500 msec they are most pronounced over the left hemisphere. So 
far we’ve discussed only the effect over the left fronto-temporal channels because this is 
the area in the sensor space where the effect is most pronounced and it is over the 
regions that fMRI studies by Hindy et al (2012) and Solomon et al (2015) showed are 
involved in the resolution of the conflict between two representations of the same token. 
As was discussed earlier, this effect in the sensor space might (or might not) be 
representative of the VLPFC competition effect seen in earlier fMRI studies. How about 
the rest of the dynamics? Research on semantic memory (Barsalou, 1999) suggests that 
conceptual representations (of objects) are distributed across brain areas recruited for 
processing sensory and motor information associated with those concepts (e.g. internal 
representations of the onion include representations of its smell, shape, motoric 
affordances, etc). Moreover, such representations are dynamic and change as a function 
of our personal previous experiences with the object as well as the more recent and 
immediate context we encounter the object in (for a review, see Yee, 2017). Information 
about certain features of the object might become available earlier because the context 
highlights/primes those features, e.g. being a participant in an eye-tracking study which 
uses a visual world paradigm might make visual features (such as shape) more salient 
than non-visual features (such as function). It doesn’t mean that function information is 
not accessible, it just means that it becomes available later in the course of object 
recognition (Yee, Huffstetler, & Thompson-Schill, 2011). In our study, we modulated the 
context in which the target word appeared such that some contexts described events that 
lead to a change of state while others didn’t. Actions which lead to a change of state such 
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as chop, crack, mash, etc change not only how the object looks before and after change 
(e.g. imagine an intact and a chopped onion), but also, for example, its motoric 
affordances: think about how picking up an intact and a chopped onion would require 
different grasps or even actions. Or in our example of a chef acting upon an onion, 
chopping an onion highlights the smell feature more so than weighing it. Actions which 
don’t lead to a change of state, such as smell, inspect, weigh are more likely to focus our 
attention only on a single generic feature set of that object (as distinct from the multiple 
feature sets associated with the dynamics of the object’s changes in state). Even though 
we didn’t run any quantitative analysis to control for the number of dimensions on which 
the object changes (and thus, potentially, the number and type of features the context 
highlights), our intuition is that grounding the object in the context which describes a 
significant change of state systematically highlights more features than the minimal 
change context. This systematic difference might have an effect on the time-course and 
topography of EEG associated with the object recognition in the substantial and minimal 
change conditions: as features of the multiple state representations attempt to activate, 
features associated with the context-irrelevant state representation need to be inhibited 
which is reflected in the alpha dynamics. 
To summarize, our study demonstrated the dynamics of neural response 
associated with a retrieval of a conceptual representation during sentence processing – 
a dynamic which couldn’t be detected in fMRI studies on which the present study is based. 
Future work will further examine such dynamics and ask more specific questions about 
its timing and neural sources. Specifically, the immediate follow-up analyses to this work 
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will look earlier in the sentence pair to examine the dynamics of neural response 
associated with building representations of objects when they are first introduced into the 
discourse and with their maintenance as discourse unfolds. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table A1. Summary of studies on theta, alpha, beta and gamma oscillations related to sentence processing 
and memory encoding and retrieval. 
Study Paradigm Theta Alpha Beta Gamma 
Sentence processing: syntax 
Bastiaansen, 
Van Berkum, 
Hagoort, 
2002a 
Gender and 
number agree- 
ment violation 
Increase in 
response to 
violations 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
Bastiaansen, 
Van Berkum, 
Hagoort, 
2002b 
Sentence reading 
(RSVP) 
Gradual 
increase as the 
sentence 
unfolded; 
increase in 
response to 
word onset 
(compared to 
the blank screen 
reference 
interval) 
Lower alpha -  
increase in 
response to 
word onset 
(compared to 
the blank 
screen 
reference 
interval); in 
lower-2 alpha 
and upper 
alpha, a 
widespread 
power decrease 
 
 
x 
 
x 
Bastiaansen, 
Magyari, & 
Hagoort, 
2010 
Word category 
violation 
Linear increase 
in correct 
sentences 
Decrease 
upon violation 
Decrease upon 
violation 
Decrease 
upon 
violation 
Meyer, 
Obleser, & 
Friederici, 
2013 
Short vs long 
argument –verb 
distances 
(tapping into the 
working memory 
load during 
sentence 
processing) 
 
x 
 
Increase during 
retention 
Increase during 
retrieval (upon 
the verb) 
 
x 
Lewis, 
Lemhӧfer,Sc
hoffelen, & 
Schriefers,20
16 
Gender and 
number 
agreement 
violation 
Increase upon 
violation 
 
x 
Decrease upon 
violation 
 
x 
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Study Paradigm Theta Alpha Beta Gamma 
Sentence processing: semantic and syntactic manipulations 
Davidson 
& Indefrey, 
2007 
Phrase 
structure 
and number 
agreement 
violation, 
semantic 
anomaly 
Increase in 
theta upon 
semantic 
violations 
Decrease upon 
violation 
Decrease 
upon violation 
 
x 
Kielar, 
Meltzer, 
Moreno, 
Alain, & 
Bialystok,  
2014 
Verb tense 
violation, 
semantic 
anomaly 
 
x 
Decrease upon 
violation 
Decrease 
upon violation 
 
x 
Kielar, 
Panamsky, 
Links, & 
Meltzer, 2015 
Semantic 
anomaly, 
syntactic 
anomaly 
Increase (1-
5Hz) upon both 
types of 
violations 
Decrease upon 
violation (different 
topography for 
different 
manipulations) 
Decrease 
upon violation 
(different 
topography for 
different 
manipulations) 
 
x 
Bastiaansen 
and Hagoort, 
2015 
Correct 
sentences (1), 
semantic (2) 
and syntactic 
(3) violations, 
syntactically 
correct-
semantically 
meaningless 
(4), words in 
random order 
(5) 
Increase upon 
semantic 
violation 
 
x 
Higher for 1 
and 4 than for 
5 throughout 
the entire 
sentence 
Higher for 1 
than for 4 
and 5 
throughout 
the entire 
sentence 
Vignali, 
Himmelstoss, 
Hawelka, 
Richlan, & 
Hutzler, 2016 
Semantic 
anomaly, 
Random word 
order 
Higher for 
structured 
sentences 
(compared to 
random order) 
 
x 
Decrease 
upon 
anomalous 
words 
Increase in 
structured 
sentences 
(compared 
to random 
order) 
Bastiaansen, 
Linden, 
Keurs, 
Dijkstra, & 
Hagoort 2005 
 
Open and 
close class 
words 
compared to 
the blank 
screen 
reference 
interval 
Increase in 
response to 
both class of 
words, however 
only open class 
words elicited 
theta increase 
over left 
temporal 
electrodes 
Decrease in 
response to words 
(as compared to 
fixation baseline) 
Decrease in 
response to 
words (as 
compared to 
fixation 
baseline) 
 
x 
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Study Paradigm Theta Alpha Beta Gamma 
Sentence processing: semantics 
Rommers, 
Dijkstra, & 
Bastiaansen, 
2013 
Literal and 
idiomatic 
contexts, within 
each they had 
correct, 
incorrect-
related-in 
meaning and 
incorrect-
unrelated 
conditions 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
Increase in 
response to the 
more 
semantically 
informative 
word, but only 
within the literal 
context; lower 
in correct 
idioms than in 
correct 
literal 
sentences 
 
Wang, Zhu, & 
Bastiaansen, 
2012 
High cloze, low 
cloze, semantic 
violation 
Increase upon 
semantic 
violation 
 
 
x 
 
x 
Increase in the 
high cloze 
condition, but 
not in the low 
cloze and 
violation 
conditions 
Wang et al, 
2012 
Congruent and 
incongruent 
sentence 
endings 
 
x 
Decrease for 
incongruent 
over the left 
hemisphere 
Decrease over 
the left 
hemisphere 
(correlated 
with the N400) 
 
x 
Peña and 
Melloni (2012) 
Spoken 
sentence 
comprehension 
in native and 
non-native 
languages 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
Gamma 
differentiates 
between native 
and non-native 
languages 
(semantic 
integration) 
Mante S. 
Nieuwland 
and Andrea E. 
Martin, 2017 
Referential 
ambiguity (4 
different 
studies) 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
Increase in 
gamma in 
response to 
referentially 
coherent 
expressions 
compared to 
referentially 
problematic 
Hald, 
Bastiaansen, 
& Hagoort, 
2006 
Semantic 
violation 
Increase upon 
violation 
x x Decrease upon 
violation 
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Study Paradigm Theta Alpha Beta Gamma 
Penolazzi, 
Angrilli, & Job, 
2009 
 
Semantic 
violation (verb 
selectional 
restrictions 
violated) 
x x x Lower upon 
violations 
Röhm, 
Klimesch, 
Haider, & 
Doppelmayr,2
001 
 
Reading, 
reading + 
semantic task 
(finding a 
superordinate 
category for the 
target word) 
Theta power 
equal between 
conditions 
(conclusion: 
working 
memory) 
Less alpha in 
the semantic 
task 
(conclusion: 
semantic 
processing) 
x x 
Bastiaansen, 
Jensen, 
Hagoort, 2008 
 
Individual 
words (with 
auditory or 
visual semantic 
properties) 
Increase to 
words (as 
compared to 
reference blank 
interval); 
topographic 
double-
dissociation for 
aud and vis 
words 
An early 
increase and 
subsequent 
decrease 
 
Increase to 
words (as 
compared to 
reference 
blank interval) 
x 
Weiss, 
Rappelsberge
r, 1996 
Abstract and 
concrete nouns 
x Coherence 
patterns 
identical for 
both abstract 
and concrete 
nouns 
Beta 
coherence 
difference 
between 
abstract and 
concrete 
nouns 
x 
Weiss et al, 
2000 
Memory 
encoding and 
retrieval of 
abstract and 
concrete nouns 
Higher 
coherence 
during the 
encoding of 
later recalled 
nouns; 
concrete nouns 
showed higher 
short-range 
coherence; 
abstract nouns 
correlated with 
higher long-
range 
coherence. 
 
 
x 
x x 
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Study Paradigm Theta Alpha Beta Gamma 
Memory: semantic association and episodic recognition tasks 
Klimesch, 
Schimke, & 
Schwaiger, 
1994 
 
Concept-
feature pairs: 1. 
Semantic task 
– are the 
features 
congruent with 
the concept; 2. 
Episodic task – 
was the same 
concept-feature 
pair presented 
before? 
Increase during 
the feature 
word 
presentation in 
the episodic 
task 
Decrease 
during the 
feature word 
presentation 
in the 
semantic 
x x 
Klimesch, 
Doppelmayr, 
Pachinger, & 
Russegger, 
1997 
Congruency 
(feature-
concept) 
matching task -
semantic, free 
association 
task – blend, 
cued recall task 
- episodic 
 
x 
Decrease in 
upper alpha 
during the 
semantic task 
(during the 
presentation 
of the second 
word) 
x x 
Klimesch, 
Doppelmayr, 
Schimke, 
Ripper, 1997 
Studying a list 
of words 
(encoding) 
followed by a 
recognition 
task 
Increase during 
the study 
phase to the 
words that will 
be later 
remembered, 
increase during 
the recognition 
phase to 
correctly 
recognized 
targets (no 
such increase 
to distractors 
and not-
remembered 
targets) 
In the lower 
alpha, 
decrease in 
response to 
items that 
later will be 
correctly 
remembered. 
In the upper 
alpha, 
increase to 
items that 
later won’t be 
correctly 
remembered 
(upper alpha 
– semantics) 
x x 
Jensen & 
Tesche, 2002 
Sternberg 
memory task 
 
Increase with 
the number of 
items to be 
remembered 
 
x 
x x 
Jensen, 
Gelfand, 
Kounios, & 
Lisman, 2002 
Sternberg 
memory task 
 
x 
Increase with 
the number 
of items 
stored in 
short-term 
memory 
x x 
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Study Paradigm Theta Alpha Beta Gamma 
Klimesch, 
Doppelmayr,S
chwaiger, 
Auinger, & 
Winkler, 1999 
Memory search 
paradigm 
 
x 
Increase in 
upper alpha 
band in the 
highest 
memory 
demand 
cognition 
x x 
Klimesch, 
Doppelmayr, 
Russegger, & 
Pachinger, 
1996 
Implicit 
memory 
paradigm 
Increase during 
the encoding of 
those words 
which could be 
remembered in 
the later recall 
task 
 
 
x 
x x 
Tuladhar, 
Huurne, 
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APPENDIX B 
Gamma power difference for the substantial vs minimal change contrast 
 57 
 
Figure B1. The dynamics of gamma (30-55 Hz) power changes. The color bars represent relative power 
change compared to the baseline period spanning from -600 to -250 msec before the determiner onset. 
  
 58 
 APPENDIX C 
This appendix contains information about the preprocessing and analysis of filler 
items, as well as brief discussion of the results. 
Preprocessing 
Filler sentences (N=160) were designed to (i) elicit transient lexical and referential 
ambiguity effects and (ii) reduce predictability of the object in the second sentence (for 
the rationale, see above). Each participant saw forty filler items which contained a lexically 
ambiguous word in the second sentence and forty control sentences (e.g. The woman 
will wash the floor. And then, she will unroll the runner/carpet), as well as forty filler items 
that contained a referentially ambiguous pronoun and forty control sentences 
(John/Daphne valued Edward because he was very knowledgeable). Since we were 
interested in the effects of lexical and referential ambiguity, our time-windows of interest 
were time-locked to the ambiguous nouns and pronouns and their controls. 
We redefined filler trials to include 850 msec before and 1260 msec after the 
noun/pronoun onset which would allow us to look at the power spectrum associated with 
the critical words in the time-window of 600 msec before and 1000 msec after the critical 
word (given the parameters of the time-frequency analysis). After removing the linear 
trend from the trials and running automatic artifact rejection, we eliminated participants 
(N=9) who had more than 50% of trials with activity exceeding the +/-100 mV threshold. 
Approximately 16% of trials were removed from the data of the 22 participants who 
entered the final analysis.  
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Time-frequency analysis and cluster-based random permutation test 
Parameters for the time-frequency analysis and permutation test were identical to 
those used for experimental items. The following comparisons were made:  
• Lexically ambiguous vs unambiguous (LexAmb) 
• Referentially ambiguous vs unambiguous (RefAmb) 
Results  
The cluster-based random permutation test didn’t reveal significant differences 
between the lexically/referentially ambiguous and unambiguous items in any of the 
frequency bands. 
 LexAmb	 RefAmb	
	 0.0-1000	msec	
theta	(4-7Hz)	 no	clust	 0.73	(neg)	
alpha	(8-12Hz)	 0.25	(pos)	 0.91	(pos)	
beta	(13-30Hz)	 0.56	(pos)	 0.85	(pos)	
 
Table C1. Results of the cluster-based random permutation tests for the lexically ambiguous vs 
unambiguous and referentially ambiguous vs unambiguous contrasts, reported are the smallest p-values. 
 
Figure C1. The dynamics of alpha (8-12 Hz) power changes. The color bars represent relative power 
change compared to the baseline period spanning from -600 to -250 msec before the determiner onset. 
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Discussion 
We believe that we didn’t find significant effects in the analysis of lexically 
ambiguous items because the contexts in which ambiguous words were used were 
strongly biasing towards the intended meaning (thus all other meanings were highly 
unlikely). The reason we didn’t find significant effects in the analysis of referentially 
ambiguous items is similar: we chose verbs which had a strong bias either towards actor 
(NP1) or patient (NP2) interpretation. 
